Air India Express Flight 1344

On the seventh of august 2020, an air india specific boeing 737 departed dubai for a repatriation flight, wearing 184 indian passengers stranded via the covid-19 pandemic. However as the plane approached the narrow tabletop runway inside the city of kozhikode, the flight took a flip for the more serious. Storms swept the runway and rain poured out of the darkness. The plane’s windshield wipers weren’t running. The primary technique had to be abandoned, forcing the pilots to attempt once more. A tailwind rose up in the back of them and the runway became slick with water. Determined to land, the captain positioned the aircraft at the floor — no longer understanding that there wasn’t sufficient room to return to a prevent, no matter his copilot’s desperate exhortation to go round. As passengers held on for pricey life, the 737 skidded off the cease of the runway, fell 30 meters down an embankment, and broke into three portions, killing 21 of the a hundred ninety humans on board. The dramatic cease to a flight that need to have added relief and joy taken aback the u . S . A . — now not necessarily because of the deaths themselves, however because the crash added again nonetheless-brilliant recollections of a totally comparable disaster 10 years earlier, concerning the equal airline, the equal kind of aircraft, and a comparable airport. Aviation protection specialists rightfully needed to ask: after air india specific flight 812 skidded off the stop of a runway in 2010, killing 158, become some thing found out? An exhaustive investigation of this modern-day accident by way of india’s aaib would find out that protection at air india express had not advanced inside the wake of the 2010 disaster — if something, it had gotten worse. A poster extols the triumph of the vande bharat assignment. (mea india)

inside the spring of 2020, because the covid-19 pandemic swept the globe, the government of india released an formidable operation to bring again millions of indians left stranded overseas due to the cessation of worldwide flights. Beginning on can also seventh, the so-known as vande bharat assignment employed dozens of planes from flag service air india and its low fee subsidiary air india express to deliver domestic hundreds of thousands of humans, specially from the middle east. By august 6th, the vande bharat challenge had resulted within the repatriation of at least 950,000 people, and a couple of comfort flights complete of stranded passengers had been touchdown each day at each important airport in india. Vt-axh, the plane involved in the accident. (konstantin von wedelstaedt)

one of these flights was air india specific flight 1344, a repatriation flight on the seventh of august which become scheduled to carry a complete load of passengers from dubai again to the town of kozhikode, a city of about 2 million humans on the coast of kerala kingdom in southern india. Kozhikode (suggested like co-rhi-code) is located on a coastal strip with out tons flat land; therefore the metropolis’s predominant port of entry, the unmarried-runway calicut airport, is a “tabletop airport,” an artificially leveled airstrip built atop a hill with steep drops on all aspects. Like many comparable airports in southern india, it may be treacherous at night time and in bad climate, particularly during the monsoon season. Thankfully, fifty nine-12 months-old captain deepak sathe, the pilot accountable for flight 1344, become no stranger to tabletop airports. Many of his 10,000 flying hours were gathered whilst he become based in kozhikode, and he had landed there 36 instances in the past year on my own. His first officer, 32-year-vintage akhilesh kumar, had started out his profession at air india express less than three years in advance and had up to now racked up approximately 2,000 hours, mostly on the boeing 737. With 184 passengers and 4 flight attendants further to the pilots, the boeing 737–800 that they might be flying that day changed into stuffed nearly to capability. The route of air india specific flight 1344. (google + own work)

on the morning of august seventh, quickly earlier than departing kozhikode to select up the passengers in dubai, captain sathe received some unwelcome information: air india specific had decided to alternate his agenda on the closing minute. At the behest of the government, the airline wanted to feature a 3rd flight out of kozhikode on the morning of the 8th, and sathe might be known as up from standby to complete it. There has been no one else who may want to do it: out of 27 pilots based totally in kozhikode, sathe changed into the most effective certified captain. More captains were being ferried in for the opposite two flights, but sathe was the simplest man or woman available to function the 1/3 one, which was scheduled to leave at eight:30 a. M. Sathe become quick to word that if flight 1344 lower back home on schedule at 19:forty, team rest limits intended he couldn’t fly again till as a minimum 9:55 a. M. Day after today. Therefore, the airline rescheduled the flight to 10:00 a. M. — meaning that if flight 1344 arrived greater than five minutes late, the flight the next day would also need to be behind schedule. Left: captain deepak sathe; right: first officer akhilesh kumar. (indiatv news)

with this in mind, the pilots flew to dubai, picked up the passengers, and headed returned to india — however now not without a 30-minute postpone on the gate, forcing captain sathe to try and make up for misplaced time en route. The seventh of august in kerala kingdom fell in the height of the monsoon season, whilst effective thunderstorms and heavy rain batter the location nearly every day. In the course of this time, pilots at air india express had to undergo monsoon schooling and observe special “monsoon approaches,” however captain sathe would no longer have been fearful; he had undergone the schooling and flew thru the monsoon season countless times before. Given the climate reviews, which mentioned a sustained wind out of the west, the pilots determined to circle around to the east side of the airport and land on runway 28, which might supply them a headwind on touchdown. Dusk had fallen by the point they neared the airport, and heavy rain had reduced visibility to close to minimums, however that turned into normal for kozhikode right now of yr. Although, the special monsoon approaches were possibly in the lower back of captain sathe’s mind: at some stage in the monsoon season, it changed into forbidden to make extra than  landing attempts; after a 2d failed technique, it become mandatory to divert, no matter gas ultimate. And if they diverted, the flight the following morning could truly ought to be cancelled. An excerpt from the cockpit voice recorder transcript. (aaib)

it changed into additionally obvious that sathe and kumar had been told of a trouble with the aircraft’s windshield wipers, an trouble which became no longer recorded in the technical log. As flight 1344 descended into the clouds that included kozhikode, captain sathe, relating to the windshield wipers, stated to first officer kumar, “you simply test that this works.”

“yeah,” stated kumar.

“remember, placed it to excessive,” sathe delivered.

“high,” kumar repeated.

“excessive, yeah, high velocity,” stated sathe. With none great problem, the pilots lined up with the localizer and glide slope, locking directly to the two guiding alerts from the tool touchdown machine. They extended the flaps and caught sight of the runway; the approach regarded to be going according to plot. However whilst first officer kumar became on the windshield wipers at 19:21, the wiper at the captain’s side didn’t come on. “what has befell to it?” sathe exclaimed. “oh shit! Wiper is long gone!”

“shit,” first officer kumar interjected. Laughing it off, captain sathe said, “what a day for the wiper to move!” kumar chuckled in conjunction with him in cohesion. No person noted the fact that the windshield wipers have been a obligatory item underneath the special monsoon approaches, and they were obligated to divert to an airport without rain if the wipers weren’t running. Moments later, simply after finishing the touchdown tick list, captain sathe ordered first officer kumar to place “all of the lights on.” apparently by means of this factor the runway was no longer seen through the swirling clouds and heavy rain.

“approaching minimums,” stated the automated voice of the enhanced floor proximity caution device (egpws).

“searching out,” stated captain sathe, attempting to find the runway.

“5 hundred,” said the egpws, announcing their top above the sphere.

“take a look at,” said first officer kumar.

“minimums,” stated the egpws. Flight 1344 had reached the minimum altitude; they couldn't fly decrease without seeing the runway. But it became obvious to captain sathe that the runway become not there to be seen. “let’s move around,” he introduced, disconnecting the autopilot and putting the aircraft into a climb. As the aircraft climbed away, the pilots retracted the touchdown tools and flaps, then knowledgeable air site visitors control that they were creating a neglected approach. Their assumption turned into that they might circle round and strive once more to land on runway 28 — that they had no way of knowing that this was now not the state of affairs which awaited them. A three-d map of the route of flight 1344, such as each processes. (aaib)

at the same time as flight 1344 become going around, an air india aircraft announced its intention to take off on runway 10, the equal runway from the opposite direction, regardless of the truth that this will placed the wind at its returned. If flight 1344 tried to land on runway 28, the 2 planes could be flying without delay at each different. To rectify the situation, the controller asked the group in the event that they have been k with touchdown on runway 10, allowing them to come in behind the departing aircraft. Captain sathe decided to handle this query himself. “don’t do some thing, pay attention,” he stated to kumar. Keying his very own mic, he stated to atc, “how’s the visibility for runway one 0?”

“each runways  thousand meters with mild rain… floor wind  six 0 stages at five knots,” stated the controller. The wind might be nearly directly at the back of them, however at handiest five knots, it turned into nicely below what will be considered dangerous on its own. Captain sathe determined to move for it. “okay, installation for one zero,” he stated to first officer kumar. The problem with touchdown in a tailwind is that it increases the velocity of the airplane relative to the ground. It isn't possible to atone for this because the lift generated by using the wings is a function of airspeed, the rate of the plane relative to the air, which incorporates the tailwind; so if a pilot slows right down to land on the ordinary ground velocity, their airspeed will drop too low and the aircraft could stall. Because of this a tailwind always method a higher landing speed and an extended landing run. Regardless of a tailwind of best five knots, the pilots have to have 2d guessed the decision to land with the wind at their backs on a moist runway with tremendously tight margins and steep drops on all facets. However no one stated a phrase about the danger they were approximately to take.

(aaib)

if the tailwind had in truth been simplest 5 knots, the tale of flight 1344 would have ended very otherwise. The hassle turned into that the actual wind throughout the ground turned into as a minimum 15 knots, gusting a whole lot higher at intermediate altitudes. The airport’s lone anemometer become placed too near the ground and in a depression among the runway embankment and an airport building, a position which investigators could later name “anomalous.” on this sheltered area, it produced readings which frequently bore little resemblance to the real wind velocity over the runway, and on pinnacle of that it turned into automatically unsound and failed often. Although, the controller faithfully relayed to the pilots whatever figures it gave him. Local climate authorities had issued  aerodrome weather warnings for kozhikode at across the time of flight 1344’s approach, indicating the presence of thunderstorms and a 17-knot wind, however the airport meteorologist whose activity it become to interpret these messages and tell the controller had left the tower against protocol and never informed him. As flight 1344 made its second approach to calicut airport, turbulence battered the plane as it struggled towards a 38-knot tailwind at a top of three,300 toes. Once more the pilots intercepted the localizer and flow slope, aligning with the runway. Simply above 2,500 feet, captain sathe ordered first officer kumar to turn the windshield wipers back on once more. “you placed it on nicely in there,” he said. “i’ll inform you when to place it on. I hope it really works.”

“take a look at,” said kumar. Sathe laughed out loud. “checked.”

kumar switched on the wipers, and this time the captain’s side wiper did come on, but only kind of. “what's this?” sathe jokingly exclaimed. “pace will be this lots simplest?” regardless of setting the wipers to “high,” they weren’t moving everywhere close to rapid enough to keep the windscreen clear of water. However once more, they persisted the method. Contacting the controller, kumar said, “calicut tower, specific india one three four 4, on ils one 0.”

“specific india one 3 four 4,” said the controller, “light rain over the sector, runway surface moist. Wind  5 0 ranges, 0 8 knots. Runway one 0, cleared to land.”

“runway one 0, cleared to land,” kumar repeated. The actual wind velocity at this altitude changed into 26 knots, consisting of a 22-knot tailwind factor and a 13-knot crosswind thing which forced the aircraft to crab sharply to the right because it descended. The winds were manner beyond what became allowed for touchdown, but the pilots had no concept, and that they endured their blithe descent into the storm.

(aaib)

this time, but, the clouds cooperated. As the egpws again announced “five hundred” and “minimums,” captain sathe stuck sight of the runway and announced, “visible. Landing.” disconnecting the autopilot, he took manage for a guide landing. At this second he changed into immediately  by using a number of visual illusions. With little visible apart from the runway lights, he could were difficulty to the “black hole impact,” wherein the absence of outside references causes the runway to look nearer than it genuinely is. Seeking to examine the runway lighting via a windshield protected in water because of the malfunctioning wiper could have produced the same effect. Due to one or each of those illusions, captain sathe apparently believed he become better than he without a doubt became, and he right now started out pushing the plane beneath the flow slope at an abnormally excessive price of descent.

“price of descent,” first officer kumar referred to as out, trying to warn him.

“take a look at,” stated captain sathe, but he kept descending at 1,500 ft per minute.

“charge of descent, captain,” kumar stated once more.

“yeah, yeah, correcting, correcting, correcting,” said captain sathe.

“glideslope,” announced the egpws. “glideslope.” the automatic machine become looking to warn them that they were too low. In response to the warnings, captain sathe increased the engines to 60% electricity, pushing the aircraft back up thru the go with the flow slope. Now they sincerely were too excessive. The method was becoming dangerously unstable and should have been deserted, but sathe had the runway in his crosshairs and he wasn’t going to give up on it now. Seconds later, the plane crossed the threshold of runway 10 at a peak of ninety two toes (28 meters) and a floor speed of 169 knots, each higher and quicker than everyday, way to the 15-knot tailwind. Indeed, the touchdown become already set to be lengthy, however captain sathe changed into about to make it a good deal worse.

(aaib)

as flight 1344 neared the ground, captain sathe pulled up to flare the aircraft for landing, elevating the nostril to plant the main gear at the runway. But, he did this too soon, with engine power set too excessive. Flaring the plane must drop it easily onto the runway, but with engine strength at 60% and increasing, this maneuver increased raise and induced the aircraft to level off completely at a top of about sixteen to twenty ft (five–6 meters). The aircraft’s sink fee bottomed out at approximately  toes per 2d as it floated down the runway, hastily eating up the distinct touchdown zone.

“just take a look at it,” said first officer kumar, perhaps pointing to the unexpectedly drawing close lights which marked the end of the touchdown vicinity. However captain sathe didn’t respond. The give up of the landing zoned zipped proper through and disappeared in the back of them. “captain?” kumar stated, beginning to sound agitated. The egpws introduced that they were ten ft above the ground. Sathe sooner or later regarded to recognize that he had floated the touchdown and moved to plant the plane on the runway. As sathe reduced the nose and decreased thrust, first officer kumar ought to inform that it became too late. “cross round,” he stated, but his feeble exhortation fell on deaf ears, as captain sathe disregarded him and slammed the plane down nearly precisely 1/2 way along the 2,seven-hundred-meter runway. From the moment the wheels touched the runway, flight 1344 was all but doomed. The runway turned into moist, the wind become at their backs, they handiest had 1,400 meters to stop, and the runway became angled barely downhill. There clearly wasn’t enough room. Captain sathe right now deployed the thrust reversers and carried out maximum braking energy, however inside seconds it have become apparent to him that they have been headed straight for the end of the runway. “oh shit!” he exclaimed. He stowed the thrust reversers and lifted off the brakes, perhaps wondering he may want to get the aircraft back down the ground, however it was too late to try this both. “shit!” he yelled once more. Panicking now, he reapplied the brakes and redeployed the thrust reversers, pushing the engines to max opposite energy. In the tower, the controller caught sight of flight 1344 and concluded that it wasn’t going to make it. Nevertheless in ownership of significant momentum, the aircraft hurtled past the end of the runway. Panicking now, captain sathe stowed the thrust reversers, briefly inflicting the engines to generate ahead thrust. For a 2nd the plane definitely multiplied, then he snapped the throttles lower back to idle. The 737 ran off the pavement and into the dust overrun area, smashed into the ils array, and careened off a 30-meter tall embankment at a velocity of 50 knots. “shit!!” first officer kumar screamed. His turned into the closing word captured at the cockpit voice recorder. A couple seconds later, the plane slammed into the floor subsequent to the airport perimeter road with a deafening crash. A diagram of the way the wreckage of flight 1344 came to relaxation. (aaib)

upon effect, the fuselage split open inside the region of first magnificence, catapulting the cockpit throughout the street and right into a brick wall, which collapsed. Numerous rows of seats with passengers in them tumbled into a pile of twisted debris within the center of the road. Farther returned, the principle fuselage segment stopped dead, even as the tail persevered downward into a ditch, causing it to split a few rows in the front of the aft galley. Within a split 2d, the shattered particles got here to a forestall, and for a moment, there was silence. The cockpit slammed via a brick wall, taking heavy damage. (indiatv news)

inside the cabin, a massive majority of the passengers had controlled to live on the brutal effect. A few observed themselves bowled over however unharmed, and in surprise they wandered out via breaks within the fuselage and onto the street. Others have been in much extra dire straits. Each pilots have been killed immediately, along side 16 passengers, and plenty of others had been trapped. Inside the place wherein the tail broke off, the floor had became almost vertical, causing seats near the break to jam in opposition to each different; several passengers right here have become trapped inside an inextricable tangle of cabin furniture. Each of the forward flight attendants have been seriously injured and not able to help, leaving the two rear flight attendants to address the evacuation of over one hundred fifty human beings. Out of doors the plane, chaos reigned as bystanders rushed to help, swarming over the plane alongside the airport firefighters, who had moved quickly around to the fringe avenue after discovering that the plane become now not at the runway. Amid the mayhem it became doubtful who was in price. Nobody informed the airport physician, no triage was performed, and severa victims have been rushed to health facility in personal taxis in place of ambulances. Attempts to unfastened trapped passengers with a gas-powered saw inadvertently caused the cabin filling with noxious exhaust fumes. And by the point a person eventually told the distinct health practitioner about the crash, the street changed into so packed with visitors that he turned into pressured to make his way to the scene taking walks. The vicinity of the cabin ahead of the wings was definitely destroyed. (hindustan instances)

all advised, eighteen humans died at the scene, and three more died later in health center, bringing the whole to 21 sufferers and 169 survivors, of whom 76 suffered serious accidents due to the acute pressure of the effect and the fall apart of numerous seat rows. Although the final results turned into much less catastrophic, the crash of flight 1344 without delay drew comparisons to any other runway overrun twist of fate that happened ten years in advance. In may additionally 2010, air india express flight 812, another boeing 737, landed long on a tabletop runway within the metropolis of mangalore in neighboring karnataka nation, causing the plane to fly off a excessive embankment and into a woodland, whereupon it burst into flames. Of the 166 humans on board, 158 were killed. Inside the intervening decade, indian airlines had now not suffered any predominant injuries — until the 7th of august 2020. What had long past wrong? How could air india specific have lost any other aircraft below close to same circumstances? Had the instructions of the mangalore tragedy no longer been discovered? The aftermath of the 2010 crash of air india express flight 812. (the parent)

answering those questions became the responsibility of the plane twist of fate investigation bureau of india, or aaib, an company created in the wake of the 2010 mangalore crash on the way to ensure investigations’ independence from the directorate popular of civil aviation. Flight 1344 would be the first time it investigated a main accident. A preliminary analysis of the records revealed the simple sequence of events. Already coming in hot because of a extreme tailwind, the captain flared the aircraft too early and too aggressively, inflicting the aircraft to drift down the runway; by the point it touched down, it become already plenty too a long way alongside. A have a look at of feasible situations confirmed that even if captain sathe had used the brakes and thrust reversers to their complete potential within  seconds of landing, the aircraft nevertheless wouldn’t have stopped in the detailed duration of the runway; but, it might have stayed on the pavement and nobody would had been harm. The plane additionally could have stopped inside the gravel overrun region if the captain had used the thrust reversers effectively but still in short permit off the brakes, as he did during the real touchdown. All other scenarios resulted within the aircraft falling off the embankment. Furthermore, if captain sathe had definitely attempted to flinch the landing while he considered doing so, the aircraft might now not have reached liftoff speed earlier than the cease of the runway, leading to an even worse accident. Indeed, although the results could have been much greater benign if sathe had nicely dedicated to preventing, the examine confirmed that the maximum severe mistake was touching down within the first vicinity. A news station breaks news of the crash of flight 1344. (information kingdom)

upon paying attention to the cockpit voice recording, investigators had been shocked to find that first officer kumar had definitely referred to as for a cross-round about one 2nd before touchdown — admittedly as an alternative overdue given the situations — and captain sathe not noted him. This changed into a violation of each precept of crew useful resource control (crm), the set of strategies which govern team interplay so as to ensure that every one pilots make use of each other’s abilties, knowledge, and judgment. To ignore any other pilot while he calls “move around” is the peak of recklessness and arrogance. In reality, while any pilot calls “move round,” the flying pilot is straight away required to conform. Conversely, while the captain did now not respond to his “cross around” call, first officer kumar become obligated to take manage of the plane and execute a pass-around himself. But, like a mirror picture of captain sathe’s vanity and satisfaction, kumar’s submissiveness and uncertainty prevented him from taking movement towards a very senior captain who turned into almost twice his age and had 5 times his experience. Witnesses and rescuers alike swarmed the wreckage to extract the survivors. (ndtv)

any such move would be hard for any first officer to make, however rigorous crm schooling can help degree the gambling field, making captains greater receptive and primary officials more assertive. The extent of relative authority between the 2 pilots is called the authority gradient: too shallow and it’s now not clear who is in charge; too steep and the primary officer may be close out of the selection-making procedure. Inside the case of flight 1344, no longer simplest did the captain ignore the first officer’s belated pass-around name, the cvr made it clean that the first officer’s position within the cockpit was confined to calling out parameters and flipping switches, as there was no dialogue among the pilots approximately guides of action and the captain made all predominant selections unilaterally. Certainly air india specific had no longer accurately trained its pilots in primary tenets of crm, which should have helped create the precise authority gradient. In fact, nearly precisely the same component occurred in the mangalore crash: in that coincidence too, the primary officer advised the captain to go round, the captain refused, and the first officer did not take manage. On this admire, not anything had changed. Police and members of the press on the crash site. (ians)

calculations showed that if the touchdown had passed off at the normal region, the landing could were unremarkable. The brakes had been all operating properly and the aircraft did no longer hydroplane, despite the moist runway. The long flare which brought about the overdue touchdown had no apparent rationalization, however investigators theorized that because of the extra velocity of the airplane on landing, the runway seemed nearer than it become. One of the methods we judge distance even as in movement is through the relative movement of objects: matters which are nearby pass through the sphere of view faster, at the same time as matters which are far away bypass by way of more slowly. If the runway lighting were shifting beyond his window faster than he predicted, it is able to have brought about the captain to accept as true with the runway turned into nearer than it virtually become. Watching for to hit the runway in the subsequent couple of seconds, he pulled lower back to flare for landing, however ended up floating the aircraft down the runway instead. A take a look at captain sathe’s education records confirmed that he time and again struggled with this exact trouble: multiple teachers had noted that he used a “prolonged flare” and had a “tendency to float throughout touchdown.” on pinnacle of that, instructors referred to that he now and again misplaced awareness even as beneath strain. In fact, he had didn't improve from the 737 to the bigger 777 due to these problems, all of which fatally manifested on board flight 1344. Rescuers enter the tail phase to loose trapped passengers. (india today)

every other feasible purpose for the botched touchdown changed into observed no longer within the black packing containers, but in captain sathe’s flight bag, which changed into discovered to comprise 4 specific diabetes medications and a bottle of ayurvedic (traditional hindu) anti-diabetic medicinal drug. Several capsules from every medication had certainly been ate up. Data revealed that the captain had been recognized with diabetes and prescribed metformin, a drug which is accepted for pilots, but he had obtained all the other drugs (a number of which must have barred him from flying) on his personal without consulting a expert in aviation remedy. Blood exams found out that as a minimum two of the medicine have been in his device at the time of the crash. Most diabetes medicines, inclusive of some that sathe had in his gadget, are prohibited for pilots because they are able to reason hypoglycemia, a condition whose outcomes consist of confusion, lightheadedness, fatigue, impaired selection-making competencies, and not on time reaction instances, among different symptoms. Given his recent consumption of several of the medicines, it became feasible that captain sathe changed into affected by hypoglycemia for the duration of the sick-fated flight, compromising his capacity to address the airplane, and causing him to make questionable decisions. Alas, captain sathe may not have recognized that these pills had been risky for pilots because neither air india express nor air india had hired an aviation remedy expert since as a minimum 2015, meaning that he become pressured to visit everyday doctors who didn’t always recognize the special guidelines for pilots. A number of the fatalities happened in this region of the aircraft which disintegrated on impact. (firstpost)

regardless of the captain’s disastrous landing flare, the seeds of tragedy have been truely planted properly before the plane touched down. Investigators heavily criticized the selection to land on runway 10 within the first location, noting that no pilot should willingly placed themselves right into a state of affairs in which they might should land on a quick tabletop runway at night in the rain with a tailwind. The risks are far too exquisite. And yet the pilots widespread the controller’s inspiration without significantly examining whether it was a good concept. The aaib rattled off a litany of further errors that proved the pilots didn’t properly plan the approach: they didn’t choose the most suitable flap placing; they behind schedule flap deployment (which changed into inappropriate in a tailwind, in view that flaps help the plane slow down in advance); they did not pick the maximum autobrake putting; they selected an approach speed which became six knots above the normal velocity for no obvious cause; and worst of all, they didn’t do the most primary step required of them: calculating the landing distance. Had the pilots calculated the legally required touchdown distance under the situations and with the aircraft configuration that they had chosen, they would have observed that their margin for error turned into unacceptably low, and they could have reconsidered their decision to land on runway 10. Several seat rows came to rest out of doors the plane close to the cockpit. (ap)

failing to calculate the touchdown distance is undoubtedly a first-rate violation of popular techniques. But investigators determined that the practice changed into considerable at some stage in air india specific. Because it became out, huge numbers of air india specific pilots have been quite truly incapable of making the required calculations, even in a lecture room placing, not to mention in flight. Moreover, the tables that they had to be had to guesstimate the distances have been now not accurate enough to produce any useful records, and boeing’s operational performance device, an ipad app which can have made these calculations for them, had now not been mounted on any air india express plane. And finally, many pilots additionally believed that calculating the touchdown distance become a waste of time in the event that they were acquainted with the airport, as captain sathe became with kozhikode. When they found the airline’s training software to recognize why it was producing pilots who couldn’t do basic math, investigators found that nearly all of the pupil pilots had been given uniformly high marks regardless of their actual capability, which become in some cases appallingly bad. This changed into a primary scandal all on its very own, however inside the midst of everything else, it most effective acquired a couple of paragraphs inside the aaib’s very last report. The offset between the tail and middle sections turned into so tremendous that one section of the ground have become vertical. (aaib)

nevertheless greater contributing elements have become apparent whilst investigators tested some of the concerns which compelled the pilots to simply accept the proposal to land on runway 10. Looming huge was the truth that the next morning’s flight would be delayed in the event that they have been late landing in kozhikode, a situation which captain sathe certainly desired to keep away from. He also needed to worry approximately the two-strive restriction on methods in monsoon conditions, that can pressure a high-priced diversion if the second technique failed. The strain on sathe changed into particularly acute due to the fact he changed into the handiest captain primarily based in kozhikode, alongside 26 first officials, an egregiously imbalanced roster that rendered sathe functionally irreplaceable. Extra so than some other pilot at air india express, the flight schedule relied on deepak sathe being to be had and punctual. In phrases of the airline’s crew rostering machine, sathe was nearly a single point of failure who should at any time reason escalating delays throughout the entire community. The purpose for this egregiously awful pilot distribution? Air india express had assigned its pilots to domestic airports based on where they currently lived, not in which pilots were sincerely needed. In reality, there were forty two captains based in delhi regardless of the truth that air india specific operated few flights there, at the same time as kozhikode, its busiest hub, had most effective one captain. The cockpit traveled a giant distance after the rest of the aircraft got here to a prevent. (ndtv)

air india express turned into an organizational catastrophe in other approaches as nicely. For instance, the top of schooling became based in delhi but training took place in mumbai; the leader of operations changed into based in chennai but the operations branch headquarters turned into also in mumbai (and the aforementioned leader of operations turned into simultaneously a boeing 747 pilot for air india); the corporate headquarters turned into in cochin; and the renovation headquarters turned into in thiruvananthapuram. The management hierarchy became mixed in with that of air india, and it become doubtful who mentioned to whom, and wherein. Seats have been strewn anywhere after the ahead fuselage disintegrated. (tribune india)

the directorate preferred of civil aviation additionally came underneath the scrutiny of the aaib for failing to put in force pointers that were made after the 2010 crash in mangalore. In truth, the aaib’s final document took the uncommon step of such as an entire bankruptcy list all of the unfulfilled tips from that crash which have been relevant to the crash of flight 1344. Regardless of hints that have been made to deal with these troubles, air india specific changed into still dependent on air india, there has been still a steep cockpit authority gradient, the airline’s simulator become still in negative mechanical situation, team scheduling become nevertheless inadequate, there was nevertheless no aviation medicinal drug expert, runway cease safety areas had been still poorly maintained, tabletop runways nevertheless didn’t have overrun safety structures, airport firefighters have been nevertheless poorly educated, and airlines nevertheless weren’t required to preserve song of long landings. Investigators get to work at the scene of the coincidence. (indiatv news)

regarding the airport itself, the aaib stated a number of failings. The airport firefighters had no longer been skilled on the functions of precise plane types, even though paperwork filed with the dgca said they were; the anemometer was close to useless; the tower meteorologist turned into not in the tower for the duration of a intense typhoon; and the airport doctor lied to investigators approximately the coordination of rescue activities. But most of all, the aaib turned into visibly aggravated that nothing have been finished to lessen the threat of runway overruns at tabletop airports after the catastrophe in mangalore. The only way of improving runway cease protection might have been the set up of engineered materials arrestor structures, or emas, which work like runaway truck ramps for planes, bringing a dashing aircraft to a halt in a quick distance using specially designed gravel. Following a dgca order to improve runway end protection regions, calicut airport considered putting in emas, however in the end went for some thing tons cheaper: twiddling with the numbers to re-designate a number of the runway as part of the runway stop protection area as an alternative. This involved no real adjustments to the runway or the protection place; the only difference changed into that the posted runway length have become lower, probably restricting the types of planes which could land on it, though in exercise there has been no real effect to operations. Cops stand in front of the shattered wreckage. (dna india)

to justify this decision, the airport authority got here up with a list of specious motives why they couldn’t install emas, maximum of which had been logical fallacies or were without a doubt less critical than the results of a runway overrun. The simplest great problem become that until the embankment had been extended (a very full-size expense), the emas installation might overlap with the runway, also a enormous rate. But an emas might have prevented the crash of flight 1344, so the query have to necessarily be requested — became the money saved sincerely really worth extra than 21 lives? On the stop of the day 169 people controlled to walk faraway from this broken aircraft. The toll may want to probable were far worse. (bbc)

in its final record into the crash of air india specific flight 1344, the aaib issued no less than forty three safety guidelines intended to ensure that one of these tragedy never takes place again. But a great deal the same thing came about after the previous crash, and very little absolutely changed. If anything, safety at air india specific have become worse. What's one to do in a country in which the pointers of safety professionals are given so little weight? Can a truely preventable crash, triggered directly by the failure of government to behave, eventually change the industry’s values and practices? Or will some other air india specific 737 run off a runway in 2030, once more taking the lives of dozens of harmless people? The answer is as much as those in india with the energy to effect real alternate. Nowadays, twelve months after the tragedy in kozhikode, it remains uncertain whether or not any other shattered plane, any other 21 bereaved households, will be sufficient to stir them from their complacency.